On September 13, a Russian drone struck a passenger train near the Polish border, minutes after a delegation of senior Western officials – among them former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and former Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt – had passed through the station. Two days later, NATO fighter jets shot down a drone that entered Lithuanian airspace overnight. While officials are investigating the origins of this drone, they have also said that these drones were carrying explosives, and that this was the first interception of this kind done in Lithuania’s history. Lithuania, a small nation in eastern Europe, borders Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave, and is thus potentially vulnerable to Russian military action. Then, on September 17th, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned parliament that Russia is planning strikes on NATO countries, especially those who have provided support to Ukraine amidst the Ukraine-Russia war. “According to intelligence assessments, Russia’s plan … includes hybrid drone and missile strikes against countries supporting Ukraine, including Poland,” Tusk said. Russia may not invade, but it is building the apparatus for an escalation, testing the line that NATO holds. The Potential Threat The most telling evidence of potential escalation comes from looking at how European nations are responding. Germany, for example, is preparing its hospitals for a potential Russian attack on NATO, according to Bloomberg. In a report that modeled possible scenarios, the German army estimated that the hospitals could receive as many as 1,000 wounded service members a day. Furthermore, on Thursday, September 17th, Finnish President Alexander Stubb told his country it was “worth mentally preparing for something to happen”, including a potential escalation of Russian military action. It is worth noting that Finland borders Russia, a border that spans 1340 kilometers (833 miles), making it the largest border shared between the Russians and a NATO member. French President Emmanuel Macron, on September 18th, summoned party leaders and France’s 2027 presidential candidates for an emergency meeting to discuss the Ukraine-Russia war, the Iran war, and the oil crisis. European leaders are using their position in the public’s eye to sound the alarm. This does not mean that an attack on Europe and NATO-aligned countries is imminent, but it does point towards a priming effect, where the public is made aware of what could well be an escalation. This could also be a strategy for Europe to deter Russian action, sending the signal to Moscow that any attempt to cross into NATO territory, or probe it with drone attacks, will be met with force. A Drone War Preceding Something Larger? Russia’s strategy of escalation is to take small steps to blur the lines of what is considered acceptable. Drone strikes in Poland, drone activity in Lithuania, and probing of airspace, through what are called “hybrid” attacks, allow Russia to enter a grey zone. Escalate in seemingly subtle yet deniable ways, and Europe can – in the name of restraint – decide not to act on it. This probing method is a tool that is used to test a target before pushing forward with a deeper, large-scale invasion. Europe is responding by emphasizing preparation, trying to project unity, and signaling to the Russians the cost of any Russian invasion of NATO-aligned countries. Is a Russian invasion a plausible threat in the near future? We do not know, but the signals are not encouraging. Ukraine has also escalated, launching hundreds of drones at Moscow on Sunday, September 20th; the attack targeted oil refineries and killed 3 people. This is part of a broader Ukrainian drone campaign to weaken Russia’s oil production, a key part of Moscow’s plan to keep Russia afloat amidst the war: Russian crude oil throughput, 2024-2027 Image source: IEA Ukraine has effectively been able to hang on in this war, with Western support. And as their technology has improved, their drone attacks on Russian oil infrastructure have proven to be more effective and sustained. Russia, therefore, has been struggling to maintain crude oil output, as we can see a sharp drop starting in June of 2026. Thus, we are seeing escalation on both sides. Ukraine is conducting more effective attacks on Moscow, and Russia is moving to use drone attacks on Ukraine-allied NATO nations. The Lesson Of 2022 The question remains, however, whether the recent alarm is part of a broader unease that the war will escalate beyond Russia and Ukraine. Would Russia be willing enough to do a ground invasion on the eastern front, thereby directly involving NATO countries like France and Germany in a hot war? It seems implausible, but then again, before 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine seemed implausible, even as Western intel found Russian troop buildup across the Ukraine-Russia border. This intel, which was made public, preceded the invasion of Ukraine, which happened days later. Interestingly, at the time, the U.S. struggled to convince allies about the threat, who openly doubted that Putin was seriously preparing an invasion. Zelensky himself spent months dismissing the warnings, publicly urging Ukrainians to stay calm rather than stock up, and insisting he did not believe a major war was coming that year. The disbelief seemed psychological. Analysts could not fathom that Russia, in the 21st-century world order, would rationally commit to a large-scale, land invasion of Ukraine. I shared that skepticism at the time, thinking it would be an absolutely foolish move on Moscow’s part, given Russia’s investments in weakening Ukraine through other means, such as funding rebels in eastern Ukraine. The world would be wrong to underestimate Russia’s brazenness again. In the same way that a Russian invasion of Latvia or Poland seems unthinkable and irrational, the same logic was used to dismiss claims of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. If NATO is well prepared, it will learn from these mistakes. Perhaps that is why Europe is ringing the alarm bells. There is, however, the potential risk of overcorrection. Baltic states, including Estonia’s Secretary General, have tried to de-escalate claims about an imminent invasion to dampen any panic. This is an interesting
By Vaibhav Sinha
Sunday, September 7, 2026. Saxony-Anhalt state election. According to CNBC-reported exit polls, the Alternative für Deutschland party took 44.4 percent of the vote, putting Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s conservatives in the rearview mirror at only 18.3 percent. No far-right party has come this close to running a German state on its own since 1945. Zoom out to the national election, and it’s the same story on a bigger stage: AfD is polling around 28 percent nationally. Comfortably first, with the CDU trailing behind by seven or eight points. This change isn’t a blip. This didn’t come out of nowhere. AfD has been gaining ground for years, and now it’s worth asking what the party would actually do with power. What They’d Do in Office Alternative für Deutschland’s economic agenda is a good place to start: the party mixes tax cuts and deregulation with a heavy dose of economic nationalism. It is marketed as protecting German industry from both Brussels and global competition. Regarding energy, the platform seeks a near-total reversal of the last decade of German climate policy: keep gas and coal plants running, restart mothballed nuclear reactors, scrap the CO2 levy, and end renewable subsidies. Alice Weidel has outright said that she’d tear down wind turbines to cut grid fees. The party also wants Germany out of the Paris climate agreement entirely. Not only that, its 2025 federal manifesto calls for immediately lifting sanctions on Moscow, and repairing the Nord Stream pipelines to restart cheap Russian gas imports. Russia is not a side issue here. On foreign policy, AfD has moved from garden-variety Euroskepticism to something more drastic: the manifesto argues that if Germany has to pick a side, it should leave both the EU and NATO, and instead align with Russia’s political and economic bloc. Additionally, they want Ukraine kept permanently outside both institutions as a neutral buffer state. That’s not a fringe faction talking. That’s the federal platform. On social policy, the Alternative für Deutschland party explicitly opposes state action on LGBTQ+ equality, and is skeptical of same-sex marriage. They branded the anti-discrimination policy as “gender ideology”, and said they want it stripped out of schools and public life alike. A direct break from decades of cross-party consensus, the party’s official platform states plainly that “Islam does not belong to Germany,”. Additionally, its immigration platform goes beyond asylum limits to include ending refugee spending, mass repatriation, and stripping the right to claim asylum in Germany altogether. Less attention gets paid to the party’s institutional agenda. Critics and researchers tracking the party note AfD rhetoric that includes expanding police powers, restricting press freedom, and questioning judicial independence, alongside expressed admiration for authoritarian leaders abroad. In Saxony-Anhalt specifically, the party’s candidates have vowed to rewrite the state’s history curriculum to shift emphasis away from the Nazi era and toward the century before it, and to pull the state out of its regional public broadcaster altogether. This is a deeply concerning, direct shot at one of the few remaining ways far-right agendas are kept in check. Who’s Actually Running This Thing The AfD party began with Björn Höcke, the head of AfD’s Thuringia branch and the informal leader of its hardest-line faction. German courts have convicted him twice for using the phrase “Alles für Deutschland,” a slogan lifted straight from the Nazi SA. He’s paid fines both times and kept his job. This isn’t a rogue backbencher; Höcke sets the tone for a huge chunk of the party’s eastern base: the same base that just delivered Saxony-Anhalt. Then there’s the party’s legal status: Germany’s domestic intelligence service classified the entire AfD as a confirmed right-wing extremist organization in May 2025. A court provisionally blocked a designation in February 2026, while the party’s lawsuit against it proceeds. That tells you the label landed somewhere it doesn’t want to be. ‘Remigration’ has become one of the party’s most controversial buzzwords. It is a shorthand in some party circles for mass deportation extending beyond undocumented migrants. This reportedly came out of a 2023 meeting in Potsdam, where AfD figures met with identitarian activists to discuss pushing out immigrants, including some holding German citizenship. When it became public, close to a million people marched in protest across German cities. That crowd size demonstrates how strongly Germans heard and disagreed with this plan. The Billionaire in the Group Chat This story cannot be told without mentioning Elon Musk; he’s called AfD “the last ray of hope” for Germany in a column for Welt am Sonntag. Musk even joined a live online chat with co-leader Alice Weidel to tell Germans to get behind the party, “or things are going to get very, very much worse.” Chancellor Olaf Scholz publicly pushed back, saying free speech “also means you can say things that are not right and do not contain good political advice,”. U.S. lawmakers across the aisle even called the endorsement unnatural. Alternative für Deutschland’s connections to parties like France’s National Rally and Hungary’s Fidesz exist, but stay at arm’s length. AfD remains politically toxic, even within Europe’s own far right. Real Anger, Aimed at the Wrong Target None of this lands without genuine grievance underneath it. Eastern Germany has spent three decades watching factories close, and young people leave for the West. Brandenburg, a region that’s felt governed from afar for a generation, is now polling AfD support above 37 percent. The AfD is the first party in decades to show up and validate the anger, rather than explain it away. Even if the party’s policy answers- leaving NATO, scrapping renewables, cutting off Ukraine- don’t obviously fix a stagnant regional economy. Chancellor Merz’s government has spent the past two years tightening national asylum policy in hopes of winning back AfD-leaning voters. It hasn’t worked; AfD’s polling lead has only widened since. Voters who want the hardline version keep choosing the original over the CDU’s watered-down copy. The Part That’s Still Undecided The “firewall”- the informal agreement among CDU, SPD, Greens, and others never to govern with
By Isha Mallareddy
Have organizations like the American Teachers' Federation prioritized their employee benefits over students' learning?
By Edward Kim
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